If the United States were to withdraw from its international commitments, relinquish its diplomatic leadership, or relinquish its military superiority, the world would become an even more dangerous place … for maintaining international influence and leverage in order to ensure U.S. security. On the surface, this seems rather obvious. However, a more in-depth view of forward presence as an object of a greater strategic culture raises potential issues for U.S. policy decisions pertaining to future forward presence. Rather than being purely interest driven, there may be a cultural aspect that guides strategic decision-making regarding forward military presence. If so, this strategic culture could influence the behavior of U.S. policy makers when the debate over continued forward presence or pursuit of alternatives to forward presence occurs.
The first section of this paper provides a brief overview of how United States forward military presence has fluctuated since World War II. The second section provides a foundation for current views on organizational culture and strategic culture. In the third section, the author analyzes the basis for forward military presence by reviewing U.S. national security policies.
The final section provides an analysis of how policy advocating forward presence could be a product of U.S. strategic culture and offers some considerations for debating future forward presence in light of cultural influence on strategic behavior. 16 Although the future stability of Iraq is a concern for the GCC states, Iran also poses a serious regional concern. In 1992, the United
States and Qatar concluded a Defense Cooperation Agreement that provided for U.S. access to Qatari bases, pre-positioning of U.S. materiel and combined military exercises. 17 Oman established defense relations with the U.S. following the Iranian revolution in 1979. The U.S.
used Oman's air base to launch failed attempts to rescue U.S. embassy hostages in Iran.
Under current access agreements, the U.S. can use Oman airfields in Muscat, Thumrait and
Masirah Island in addition to the pre-positioning of bombs and other weapons. 18 In 1994, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced a defense pact with the United States. The UAE assisted the U.S. between 1991-2003 in containing Iraq primarily through pre-positioning of equipment and hosting U.S. refueling aircraft. Although publicly opposed to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the UAE hosted additional U.S. force for the operation. 19 Finally, at any given time, there are about 90,000 U.S. troops in Kuwait, waiting to deploy into Iraq, and about 20,000
permanently based in Kuwait. 20 As stated earlier, it may seem obvious that a large forward presence is essential to maintaining influence in international and regional stability in order to promote U.S. security.
However, the purpose of this research is to consider whether there might be a cultural aspect that influences U.S. policy decisions toward forward military presence. The next section discusses the concept of strategic culture and sets the framework for further analysis.
Strategic Culture
It is important to understand the basics of organizational culture before turning to a discussion of strategic culture. Edgar H. Schein, widely acclaimed as one of the founders of organizational psychology, defined the culture of an organization as "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." 21 Prior to his definition, Schein makes it clear that when he uses the term "group" in his definition, he is referring to social units of all sizes, including organizations.
Schein offers that cultures manifest themselves along three different levels ranging from artifacts, to values, to underlying assumptions (see Figure 1 ). Artifacts are the aspects of a culture that one "sees, hears, and feels when encountering a new organization" and are easy to observe, but sometimes hard to decipher. Espoused values are those values put forth by leadership in an organization that become embodied in the organizational philosophy, which can serve as "a guide and as a way of dealing with uncertainty of intrinsically uncontrollable or difficult events." Finally, basic underlying assumptions, which Schein defines as the "essence of culture," are such strongly held beliefs in a group that members will find behavior inconsistent with these basic assumptions inconceivable. As such, basic assumptions, or deeply held beliefs, are rarely confronted and hence extremely difficult to change. 22 According to Schein, culture as a set of basic assumptions defines what individuals, or organizations, pay attention to, how they interpret the external environment and how they react in emotional situations. Humans desire cognitive stability. Reexamining basic assumptions temporarily destabilizes the human cognitive and interpersonal world, creating large amounts of anxiety. Therefore, rather than tolerating the anxiety levels associated with challenging basic assumptions, even if it means "distorting, denying, projecting, or in other ways falsifying" what may be going on around the organization, individuals tend to perceive the events around them as congruent with assumptions. Of course, the concern is that others outside the organization, who do not share or understand the same basic assumptions, may misinterpret actions of the organization. 23 Therefore, the key to correct interpretation of the actions of an organization is to understand the basic assumptions that form the foundation for the cultural behavior.
The notion of strategic culture is relatively new and still stimulates much debate as to its utility. Writings on strategic culture started in the 1980s with noted writers such as Jack Snyder and Colin Gray, as they compared Soviet and U.S. nuclear strategies. It appears the initial goal of the earlier writers on strategic culture was to bring the discussion of culture back into the debate over policy formulation by speculating how a cultural "mind-set" might influence strategic decision-making. 24 The intent was not to develop a new theory for decision-making, although subsequent writers expanded on this possibility.
In a RAND study of Soviet strategic culture, Jack Snyder defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other" with regard to strategy development. 25 He assessed that strategic cultures maintain a large degree of continuity unless objective conditions cause a change.
Likewise, he discussed the premise that there are bodies of attitudes and beliefs that guide and circumscribe thought on strategic issues and frame how strategic issues are formulated for debate. Colin S. Gray added to the study of strategic culture and its importance by raising the question of the "roots and influences" of strategic culture on strategic behavior. He writes how early theorists of strategic culture hypothesized that different security communities tend to exhibit in stated thought and behavior patterns that could be termed cultural, which in turn became patterns for distinctive strategic behavior within those communities. Like Snyder, Gray assessed that strategic culture can change over time but would do so very slowly. 27 However, without clear understanding of history and new historical experiences, decision-makers might fall back upon strategic culture to guide strategic behavior although a historically altered response might be more appropriate. 28 This relates back to Schein's statement that individuals, and therefore organizations, desire cognitive stability. Strategic culture, which includes the assumptions that underlie strategic behavior, must make sense to the human agents and client organizations. 29 Gray asserts that "strategically [encultured] people" will behave in ways influenced by their pattern of assumptions and although strategic culture need not dictate a particular course of action, the effects of strategic culture will be strongly stamped upon strategic behavior. Unlike other writers, Johnston offers a method of analysis for the potential existence of strategic preferences emanating from a strategic culture by observing objects of the culture.
Johnston's method involves choosing objects or artifacts such as policy documents from the period under study and comparing them with samples from a past period. If there is congruence in preference rankings, one might ascertain that a strategic culture exists and has persisted across this historical time. 32 From a "system of symbols" perspective, strategic culture may be President Truman, the U.S. was now an "internationalist" or "globalist" state that would "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." 34 The actual national security strategy pertaining to the Soviet Union and the execution of the Cold War was enunciated in NSC-68, a classified document that served as the framework for much of the security policy throughout the Cold War. 35 Although the containment of Soviet expansion is popularly thought of as the main reason for the national security directive, the U.S.
policy of developing a healthy international community was a primary objective despite the Soviet threat. As stated in the document, the actual intention of NSC-68 was to foster a world in which the American system could survive and flourish. Any thoughts of isolation should be dismissed. 36 However, the threat of Soviet expansion provided a common enemy for the U.S.
leadership to rally support for the policy. As early as 1946, there was such overwhelming support for containing communist expansion from the Soviet Union that 80 percent of the U.S.
public opposed the withdrawal of American forces from Europe.
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Emily S. Rosenberg, a PHD and writer on U.S. cultural expansion, wrote of the cultural relevance of NSC-68. NSC-68 was an instrument to tie the future of the United States to the historical past stemming from the Constitution by providing that the fundamental purpose of the U.S. is "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual." The nation had a new enemy capable of unbelievable acts, which necessitated pursuing international goals. access to foreign markets, energy and mineral resources, in cooperation with existing allies. 48 The NSS clarified that forward deployed forces are maintained to: first, honor U.S. commitments to allies and second, to contain and reverse expansion of Soviet influence worldwide. 49 This was the beginning of a shift away from a purely containment mission.
Although focus remained on defeating the Soviet Union, President Reagan articulated in his last few national security strategies the belief that national interests emanated from enduring values, which necessitated forward presence. National interests, as stated in the 1987 NSS, were security of the U.S. as an independent nation, economic growth, promotion of democracy throughout the world with free and open market economies, a secure world free of major threats and a healthy and vigorous U.S. alliance relationship. 50 The emphasis for forward presence was placed on a strategy of forward defense and alliance solidarity. Therefore, it was consistent with this strategy to maintain a large, forward deployed force in order to deter aggression. 51 In his final NSS, President Reagan emphasized that the United States' strategy from year to year would change little due to objectives and interests derived from enduring values. 52 In the three national security strategy documents provided during President George H. W. President Clinton provided that overseas forces must be in key regions to demonstrate commitment to allies and friends, underwrite regional stability, gain familiarity with overseas operating environments, promote combined training and provide timely initial response capabilities. 55 An addition to President Clinton's Engagement and Enlargement policy proposed an allowance for the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums in order to ensure regional stability. The U.S. military would promote an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace and stability, for developing democracies and free-market economies that would in turn ensure America's own economic well-being and security. 56 Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, followed the NSS with a comprehensive "Bottom-Up Review" of the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure and foundation that credited military presence with giving stronger influence to political, economic and military affairs in key regions while ensuring access to the facilities and bases the U.S. would need during conflict or contingencies. 57 In President George W. Bush's first NSS, he states plainly that the forward presence of American forces overseas is "one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends." He goes on to say that to meet the security challenges that the nation faces, the United States will require bases within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia. Although articulated objectives of the national security strategies changed over time, preference ranking for forward military presence remained relatively unchanged from the Cold War to post-Cold War period. As objects of analysis, the presidential doctrines and national security strategies spanning the two periods described different threats to national security.
However, the preference ranking for forward military presence remained constant enough to warrant maintaining at least one-fifth of U.S. military overseas. The threats between the two periods were framed in such a way that the role and efficacy of forward military presence seemed to be a unique strategic preference for countering each of the threats. In reality, it was just a continuation of the same belief that forward military presence is essential to national security. If so, then this belief is the essence of a strategic culture within the U.S. that guides the strategic behavior of policy makers to continually rank forward military presence as a necessary measure for ensuring national security and to potentially overlook other strategic preferences.
Based upon the concept that forward military presence stems from a U.S. strategic culture, one could predict the strategic behavior of policy-makers for decisions pertaining to future U.S. forward military presence. The complexity of the world is increasing with trends in globalization, information technology and international interactions that blur the distinction of sovereign borders. As new policy-makers such as presidents, secretaries of defense or state, congressional members and advisors to these policy-makers, enter into the decision-making body of the U.S. government, they will find it increasingly difficult to comprehend the complexity of the growing international threats to U.S. security. Therefore, they will seek answers to security questions, which will be equally evasive. Depending upon their historical experiences or understanding of history, they may find it difficult to assess the risks of the current environment. Likewise, any attempt to decrease forward presence will cause conflict and anxiety because it questions the basic underlying assumption that forward presence is required to ensure influence and leverage in international affairs for the pursuit of security in the United
States. Seeking cognitive stability in this complex environment and on a topic that probably carries emotional appeal, policy makers will find comfort in the status quo of culture.
With the thought of a strategic culture that persists in the U. access to their territory and blunt U.S. power-projection. 62 The fourth consideration is other states or non-state actors who do not completely understand the U.S. strategic culture, might interpret U.S. forward presence as more imperialistic rather than security driven. It is imperative that the U.S. effectively convey a clear Endnotes
